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Basel II rules allow qualified banks to assess the risk in their portfolio of credit exposures 
with a methodology based on the informational content of credit ratings and two crucial 
assumptions: (1) the credit risk of individual exposures is driven by one systematic risk 
factor only and (2) the portfolio is fully diversified. We test the accuracy of the credit risk 
measures obtained with the new rules by comparing them with benchmark measures 
derived with a popular ratings-based credit risk model which accounts for multiple risk 
factors and portfolio concentration. We find that the Basel II assumptions may have a 
substantial impact on risk assessments and produce deviations from the benchmark that 
may be economically significant. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From the beginning of 2007 European banks are required to assess the credit risk in their 
portfolios with a set of new rules collectively known as the New Accord or Basel II. The 
new regulatory framework has introduced radical changes to the existing regulation and 
is quickly becoming a benchmark worldwide with all the major non-EU economies and 
most emerging markets planning to introduce it within the next few years.  
 
Basel II entails a three-pronged approach to bank capital regulation, (1) a comprehensive 
set of rules designed to measure the risks in banks’ portfolios and to produce minimum 
capital requirements, (2) a supervisory review process setting out the role of bank 
supervisors in ensuring that the new framework is correctly implemented and (3) 
disclosure requirements to induce banks to make available more information about the 
key risks in their books with the objective of improving bank accountability and market 
monitoring. Under the first “pillar”, banks can calculate credit risk capital requirements 
by choosing one of three approaches. This flexibility was introduced in answer to the 
criticism levelled at the “one-size-fits-all” approach of Basel I, the previous regulation. 
All three options fundamentally depart from Basel I in that they employ credit ratings as 
a way to assess individual exposures’ credit risk. The three options are called the 
standardised approach (SA), the foundation internal rating based approach and the 
advanced internal rating based approach (collectively called IRBA hereafter). The SA is 
based on external ratings as assigned by recognised rating institutions whereas the other 
two approaches, as their names suggest, rely on ratings internally derived by the banks.
1 
National supervisors allow banks to adopt the latter approaches only if they are satisfied 
that the internal rating assignment process is sufficiently accurate.
2  
 
                                                 
1 Krahnen and Weber (2001) and Crouhy et al (2001) describe the principles and technical aspects one 
should consider when devising an internal rating system. Carey (2001) and Jacobson et al (2006) present 
some evidence on the consistency of banks’ internal credit ratings. 
2 In this respect, the Basel Committee have produced a comprehensive survey of techniques for the 
validation of internal rating systems (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2005). Carey and 
Hrycay (2001) on the other hand, investigate the potential pitfalls of internal rating systems and suggest 
that a combination of several rating methods would help reduce their most common weaknesses. 
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The Basel Committee have conducted several “quantitative impact studies” to test the 
effect of the new rules on banks’ regulatory capital. However, the main focus of such 
studies was to compare the new and the old regulation and to determine whether the new 
regulation would yield substantially lower capital requirements. On the other hand, most 
of the available studies on the actual accuracy of Basel II refer to earlier drafts of the new 
framework which has been substantially modified since the release of the first 
consultative papers in 1999 and 2001, also to incorporate some of the points made in 
these studies. Examples are, Altman and Saunders (2001) who show that the risk weights 
associated with the risk categories in the SA do not accurately represent the credit risk of 
assets that fall in such categories, and Sironi and Zazzara (2003) who measure the 
inconsistencies between the asset correlation assumptions in the IRBA and asset 
correlations implied from empirically observed default correlations. The final version of 
the New Accord (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006) indeed presents 
new risk weights for the SA and a revised treatment of asset correlation in the IRBA. 
However, following the latest changes, Resti and Sironi (2007a) take another look at the 
SA and conclude, in agreement with Linnell (2001), that the different treatment of banks 
and non-bank corporations in the New Accord is not justifiable. Their empirical evidence 
suggests that the credit risk of banks and non-banks with the same rating are statistically 
indistinguishable. They also conclude that the current risk categories are too coarse and 
should be more granular to increase accuracy, and that the risk weight curve across risk 
categories should be steeper.  
 
Empirical tests on the IRBA focus mainly on the accuracy of the regulatory approach 
when measuring the risk of loans to small and medium enterprises and/or retail 
exposures. Perli and Nayda (2004) develop a credit risk model for retail exposures that 
accounts for future margin income and find that the negative relationship between 
probability of default and asset correlation established in the IRBA does not necessarily 
hold empirically. Calem and LaCour-Little (2004) show that geographical diversification, 
which is not directly addressed in pillar 1 of Basel II, has an important role in 
determining the economic capital of mortgage loan portfolios. Jacobson, Lindé and 
Roszbach (2005) through a re-sampling method applied to a large database of bank loans 
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from two major Swedish banks find no evidence in support of the IRBA assumption that 
SME loans and retail credits are systematically less risky than wholesale corporate loans. 
With the same data and analytical approach Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2006) show 
that IRBA capital can be 6 to 9 times higher than economic capital.
3 The re-sampling 
technique they adopt has the advantage that it allows them to derive portfolio loss 
distributions without making any of the assumptions (e.g. on correlations) underlying a 
credit risk model. However, the usefulness of their approach is reduced in portfolios of 
wholesale corporate loans. First, wholesale credits are larger in size and smaller in 
number than retail and SME credits in a typical bank portfolio, which will lessen the 
accuracy and significance of re-sampling. Second, conducting re-sampling on a database 
where only default losses are recorded (but not losses in loan value arsing from rating 
downgrades) will not produce meaningful risk measures when there are no or few 
historical defaults in the sample. Furthermore, the practice of marking-to-market portfolio 
exposures and hence directly account for downgrade losses is becoming increasingly 
relevant today with the widespread use of securitisations, also in the retail lending sector.  
 
The contribution of this paper is to provide new ways in which to test the accuracy of SA 
and IRBA on a portfolio of wholesale corporate exposures. We do so by comparing the 
regulatory capital obtained from the Basel II approaches with the economic capital 
resulting from CreditMetrics, a popular credit risk model which provides a natural way to 
relax the assumptions underlying the IRBA. Furthermore, we single out the effect of 
correlation and downgrade risk, as well as, loan maturity, probability of default and credit 
rating on the estimation bias produced by the regulatory models. We do so dynamically 
over a ten year period on portfolios of eurobonds with different granularity and risk 
characteristics. We find that the IRBA (as well as the SA) can produce regulatory capital 
that is as much as three times larger than the economic capital generated with 
CreditMetrics. This bias has the same order of magnitude as in Jacobson et al (2006) but 
is smaller, probably because of the explicit inclusion in our analysis of downgrade losses 
which cause economic capital to rise. The fact that previous findings about the 
                                                 
3 This result is derived from Table 12 in their paper. A typo in the text of the paper refers to regulatory 
capital being 6% to 9% higher than economic capital rather than 6 to 9 times higher. 
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conservativeness of the new capital regulation are broadly confirmed reinforces concerns 
about the economic impact of the new rules especially in the light of the ongoing debate 
about the propensity of the New Accord to aggravate credit rationing in recessions (see, 
for example, Gordy and Howells 2006).  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the data used for our analysis. In 
Section 3 we describe the Basel II models for credit risk. Section 4 introduces the 
benchmark model that we employ to test the accuracy of the regulatory models. In 





The data we use for this study were obtained through Reuters and include US dollar-
denominated bonds issued by 502 firms
4. Our criteria in selecting the bonds are (i) that 
they were neither callable nor convertible, (ii) that a rating history was available, (iii) that 
the coupons were constant with a fixed frequency, (iv) that repayment was at par, and (v) 
that the bond did not possess a sinking fund.  
 
The composition of the total portfolio is shown in Table 1. 46.4% of the obligors are 
domiciled in the United States. A further 27.5% of the companies are headquartered in 
Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, France or the United Kingdom. 54% of the companies 
in our sample are in the financial services or banking sectors.  
 
To implement the benchmark model, we also needed: (i) transition matrices, (ii) default 
spreads and default-free yield curves over time, (iii) equity index data and (iv) a set of 
weights linking individual obligors to the equity indices. Transition matrices were 
sourced from Standard and Poor’s (see Vazza, Aurora and Schneck 2005). Default-free 
                                                 
4 Of these, 90% were eurobonds, the remainder are national bonds from several countries. 
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interest rates and spreads for different ratings categories were taken from Bloomberg.
5 
We also created an equity index dataset going back to 1983 and comprising 243 country 
and industry-specific MSCI indices. For each obligor, based on the domicile and industry 
classification provided by Reuters, we then chose one of these indices as the source of 
systematic risk.  
 
3. Basel II 
 
In this section we briefly summarise the main features of the alternative approaches to 
computing credit risk capital requirements in Basel II, the SA and the IRBA. The SA and 
IRBA are implemented with variations that depend on the type of borrower namely, large 
corporations, sovereigns, banks and retail borrowers. We shall focus on large 
corporations and banks only, as the data we employ for the empirical analysis are bonds 
issued by these types of obligors. 
 
The SA produces a capital requirement with a method similar to that in use in the first 
Basel Accord (Basel 1988), also called Basel I. Each claim is assigned a risk weight and 
regulatory capital is given by the sum of the values of all claims, multiplied by their 
respective risk weights, and a constant factor of 8%. In Basel I weights vary in relation to 
the type of borrower. In the SA of Basel II, risk weights vary according to both borrower 
type and the borrower’s external credit rating. Different risk charges are applied to un-
rated companies.
6 For claims on banks, the SA offers two options and all banks in a 
country will be subject to one of the two at the discretion of the national supervisor. 
Under option 1, the risk weight depends on the risk category assigned to the country of 
incorporation of the borrowing bank. Risk categories are identified by the range of 
sovereign ratings that attract the same risk weight. So, for example, sovereign ratings 
from AAA to AA- represent one category as all have a 0% risk weight. Option 1 is 
particularly suitable for countries whose banks are mostly unrated. Under option 2, the 
                                                 
5 We used spreads for United States industrials since these had the longest series and the fewest missing 
observations. 
6 All firms in our sample are rated so the un-rated weight has not been used. 
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risk weight depends on the borrowing bank’s own credit rating.
7 A summary of SA risk 
weights for large corporations, sovereigns and banks is reported in Table 2.  
 
The credit risk capital charge under the two internal rating based approaches is based on 
the same analytical framework. However, it is only in the advanced IRBA that banks are 
responsible for estimating all the four parameters of the model, probability of default 
(PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and effective maturity (M). 
Banks under the foundation IRBA will have to provide own estimates of the PD, but they 
are required to follow specific computation rules for the other three parameters. For both 
approaches, the minimum capital requirement is given by, 
 





where RWAs denotes the risk weighted value of asset s, and N is the total number of 
assets in the bank’s credit risk portfolio. The RWAs is defined as follows, 
 
s s s EAD UL RWA ⋅ =            ( 2 )  
 
where ULs is the percent unexpected loss in asset s and EADs is the asset’s exposure at 
default. From this formula we can infer that regulatory capital under the IRBA is 
designed to cover only for unexpected losses. This is because banks systematically set 
aside provisions for expected losses. ULs is defined as the difference between the 
expected loss from borrower s in a downturn scenario and the expected loss under a 
normal scenario. It is formally defined as,
8 
 
                                                 
7 Also paragraph 62 in Basel II states “… a preferential risk weight that is one category more favourable 
may be applied to claims with an original maturity of three months or less, subject to a floor of 20%. This 
treatment will be available to both rated and unrated banks, but not to banks risk weighted at 150%”. 
8 A comprehensive description of the rationale behind the UL formula can be found in Resti and Sironi 
(2007b), Chapter 20, and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005). 
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where CF is a calibration factor that was introduced to broadly maintain the aggregate 
levels of regulatory capital that were in place before the introduction of Basel II. The 
factor is currently equal to 1.06. Φ denotes a cumulative standard normal.   is an 
expression for the probability of default in a downturn scenario and is fully derived in the 
Appendix. MAs is a maturity adjustment which grows with effective maturity, M, and 
falls as PD increases. The idea behind it, is that longer maturity bonds, which are riskier, 
should attract a higher capital charge. However, if PD goes up, the MAs will fall because 
lower quality assets are exposed to downgrade risk to a lower extent than higher quality 
assets. In other words, the scope for loss in value due to a downgrade is larger for a AAA 
asset than for an asset with lower credit rating.
9 The maturity adjustment is given by, 
() . Φ
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b(PDs) has been calibrated on market data to produce the downgrade effect discussed 














t s c c t M ,           ( 6 )  
   
where ct denotes the cash flow of asset s at time t. Rs in (3) is a correlation coefficient that 
measures the dependence between the return of borrower s’s assets and the return on a 
                                                 
9 This does not mean however that higher quality exposures will attract higher capital charges. Although 
they will have a higher MA, their PD, which has a dominant effect on the unexpected loss in (3), will drive 
down their risk weight. Therefore, the impact of MA as credit quality improves is to make the fall in capital 
requirement less sharp.  
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systematic risk factor.
10 By analysing a large database of US, Japanese and European 
firms Lopez (2004) found Rs to be a decreasing function of the probability of default and 
an increasing function of the size V of borrower s. These  findings have been 
implemented in the internal rating based approach with the following formula, 
 
  
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() () ( []
() () 45 5 - V - 1 0.04 -         
50 1 50 1 1 24
50 1 50 1 12 0
/
exp / PD exp .




− − ⋅ − − − ⋅ + ( ) ) 0         
− − ⋅ − − ⋅ =
    (7) 
 
where V is measured in terms of the firm’s annual sales in million Euros. The size 
adjustment does not apply to companies that have a turnover of more than 50 million 
Euros, and is set at –0.04 for those with annual sales lower than 5 millions. Although we 
do not have turnover data for the companies in our sample, it is plausible to assume that 
their size is considerable, since most of them are eurobond issuers. Therefore, we do not 
apply the size adjustment. If we ignore the size adjustment, (7) indicates that Rs is a 
weighted average of, i.e. it varies between, 0.12 and 0.24, with the parenthetic values 
being normalised weights that sum 1. The weights are a function of PD and cause Rs to 
decline as PD increases.  
 
Interestingly, regulatory capital under the IRBA is additive - as is in the SA and in Basel I 
- in the sense that to arrive at the total capital requirement one needs to sum the 
individual capital charge of each asset in the portfolio. However, while additivity in Basel 
I and the SA in Basel II follows from the implicit assumption that assets in the portfolio 
are perfectly correlated, the IRBA additivity is the result of the assumptions that the 
portfolio is perfectly diversified (or infinitely granular) and that only one systematic risk 
factor drives the correlation among the assets in the portfolio.
11 Therefore, in the IRBA, 
additivity obtains even though correlation is less than 1. 
 
                                                 
10 Provided that the systematic risk factor is the same across borrowers, the factor cancels out in the 
derivation of the ULs formula and so it need not be explicitly identified, (see the Appendix for details). 
11 See Gordy (2003) for a detailed derivation of this result and an analysis of the properties of the IRBA 
model. 
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We implement as closely as possible the advanced IRBA by using the information in our 
data sample. M is estimated as in (6) and subject to a lower and upper boundary of 1 and 
5 years respectively as indicated in Basel II.
12 For the probability of default, as we lack 
internal rating data, we assume that the bank’s internal rating system perfectly replicates 
that of a recognised rating agency, Standard and Poor’s. This is not implausible as Basel 
II allows banks to map their internal ratings to agency ratings and employ the default 
probabilities of the latter.
13 The PDs fed into the IRBA model are, at each point in time 
and for each credit rating, the averages of point-in-time default rates for that rating over 
the previous five years.
14 As prescribed in Basel II, we constrain default probabilities to 
be greater than or equal to 0.03%.
15 As we do not have enough information on loss given 
default for different seniorities over the sample period, we use a flat LGD of 50% across 
the whole sample.
16 The exposure at default is equal to 1 for each firm as we aim to form 
portfolios in which assets are equally weighted. 
 
 
4. The benchmark 
 
The IRBA in Basel II is derived under some restrictive assumptions, namely that (1) the 
credit risk of individual exposures is driven by one systematic risk factor only, and that  
(2) the portfolio of exposures is fully diversified. To remove such assumptions we use 
CreditMetrics, a popular credit risk model proposed by Bhatia, Finger, and Gupton 
(1997). The model allows for multiple systematic factors and portfolio concentration. 
Below we describe its main features. 
 
                                                 
12 See BCBS 2006a, para. 320. 
13 See BCSB 2006a, para. 462. 
14 According to Basel II default probabilities should be estimated by taking average default rates over a 
minimum period of five years (See BCBS 2006a, para. 447, 463). 
15 See BCSB 2006a, para. 285. 
16 More than 70% of our bonds are unsecured, (57.34% of unsecured proper and 14.14% of senior 
unsecured) which, according to Carty and Lieberman (1996) have an average recovery rate of 51.13%. 
Bonds with lower seniority (that is, subordinated), and hence with a lower recovery rate, account for only 
1.55% of the total sample. 
 
Copyright 2007, Varotto. All rights reserved.  11ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2007-09 
The main contribution of CreditMetrics is a simple way in which to model the correlation 
of illiquid credit exposures. Most bank loans are illiquid in the sense that they are not 
traded, in an exchange or over the counter, and hence their prices are not available. 
CreditMetrics models the price of a credit exposure as a discrete process. The exposure’s 
future value will depend on the credit rating of the borrower at the chosen horizon 
(typically one year). The correlation between any two exposures will then depend on how 
their future rating scenarios are correlated. The idea in CreditMetrics is to model changes 
in rating scenarios of borrower s with a standard normal latent variable Qs that represents 
the return of the assets of that borrower. Positive and large asset returns will push the 
borrower towards a higher rating, while large negative returns will cause a downgrade 
and, in severe cases, default. The thresholds Zi,j that determine transitions from an initial 
rating i to a rating j, are computed by employing the transition probabilities  j , i π  found in 
rating transition matrices. These are regularly published by all the major rating agencies. 












Φ − Φ =
Φ =
AA , i AAA , i
D , i CCC , i CCC , i









      ( 8 )  
 
Transition probabilities in a given year are estimated by taking the average of the 
previous 5 years’ point-in-time transition matrices. To take into account indirect 
migration and generate non-zero default probabilities for ratings at the top end of the 
rating scale we use the “generator” approach introduced by Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull 
(1997) and refined by Israel, Rosenthal and Wei (2001). 
 
The value of the asset return Qs is assumed to depend on one or more systematic factors. 
Under the simplifying assumption that each borrower’s asset return depends on one factor 
only, the asset return will be given by,  
 
s s s s X Q ε θ + =         ( 9 )  
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where   and  s X s ε  denote the standardised return on the factor and the idiosyncratic 
component of the firm’s asset return respectively. Then, the correlation between the asset 
return of borrower s and v will be  v , s v s ρ θ θ  where  v , s ρ  is the correlation between factors 
 and  . In CreditMetrics  s X v X v , s ρ  is proxied with the correlation of the equity indices 
that most closely represent borrower s and borrower v. Typically, the chosen index is that 
of the country and industry sector in which a borrower operates. However, it is unclear 
how the systematic factor loading  r θ  should be estimated. For simplicity, we use the 
approach in the IRBA which expresses  s θ  as  s R . This has the additional advantage of 
simplifying the comparison between the regulatory model and the benchmark, as it 
eliminates one of the potential sources of difference. 
 
Since the latent variable Qs is standard normal, one can easily apply Monte Carlo 
methods to generate correlated rating scenarios for all the loans in the portfolio and 
derive the distribution of portfolio values
17.  Then, the portfolio loss distribution is 
obtained by taking the difference between the 1 year forward value of the portfolio under 
the assumption that all exposures maintain their current rating and the generated portfolio 
values.
18 By computing the Value-at-Risk at the 99.9% confidence level on the loss 
distribution, as prescribed by Basel II, the unexpected loss can then be estimated as the 
difference between the VaR and the loss mean value. The comparison of the unexpected 
loss so derived with the regulatory models’ capital charge will be the focus of our 





In this section we compare the capital charge produced by the benchmark with the capital 
charges of Basel II’s SA and IRBA. The starting point of our analysis is the asymptotic 
single risk factor model (ASRF) of Gordy (2003), a special case of both, the IRBA and 
                                                 
17 See Bhatia et al (1997), Chapters 10 and 11 for details. 
18 See, for example, Crouhy et al (2000), Section 2.4. 
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the benchmark. By adding the assumptions that distinguish the two models from the 
ASRF, one at a time, we will be in a position to study how they diverge and why.  
 
Table 3 summarises our findings. The three features that cause the IRBA to depart from 
the ASRF are the maturity adjustment, the 0.03% default probability floor and the 
calibration factor. All of them increase the capital requirement relative to the requirement 
one obtains with a straightforward application of the ASRF. The maturity adjustment has 
the largest impact with an average increase in capital of 82.4%. The default probability 
floor follows with a 50.4% increase, while the calibration factor adds a further 14.0%. 
The benchmark, on the other hand, introduces granularity effects, (explicit) downgrade 
risk and multiple systematic risk factors to the basic ASRF. The largest rise in capital is 
caused by downgrade risk, +108.6%, followed by granularity effects with +36.9%. The 
introduction of multiple factors on the other hand reduces capital by a substantial 
41.5%.
19 The sum total of the above modelling assumptions for the IRBA is +146.8% 
which is higher than the total for the benchmark (+104.0%). Therefore, from these initial 
observations it appears that the regulatory model produces more conservative capital 
requirements than the benchmark. Below we shall investigate the causes behind this 











                                                 
19 Within the framework of the benchmark model, using a single systematic factor is equivalent to using 
multiple perfectly correlated factors. Hence, as risk factors are always less than perfectly correlated, it 
follows that portfolio correlation, and as a result, unexpected losses, go down when multiple factors are 
introduced in the model. 
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Note: In this graph we report the percentage difference in UL between CreditMetrics and the ASRF model 
as the number of exposures in the portfolio increases. Results are based on a sample of fictitious exposures 
with identical default probability and exposure at default, and a loss given default of 50%. The confidence 
level used to derive UL with both models is 99.9%. CreditMetrics has been implemented without 
downgrade risk and with a single risk factor. 
 
Figure 1 shows that CreditMetrics with no downgrade risk and a single systematic factor 
actually converges to the ASRF as portfolio diversification increases. The Figure also 
reveals two important points. First, credit risk may be hard to diversify. In portfolios with 
one hundred exposures, the UL of CreditMetrics may still exceed the UL based on full 
diversification (ASRF) by a non negligible amount, due to concentration effects. Second, 
in high quality portfolios, convergence is slower. For example, with an average portfolio 
PD of 0.1%, the discrepancy between CreditMetrics and ASRF is still 15.9% when the 
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Note: The benchmark model is implemented with no downgrade risk and a single factor. ULs are expressed 
as percentages of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. Time refers to the date at the VaR horizon, i.e. 
current time plus 1 year. 
 
Figure 2 shows the granularity effect when the benchmark is applied to our bond data. 
The benchmark is implemented in the simplest way, that is without downgrade risk and 
with a single systematic risk factor. The difference in unexpected loss is larger at the 
beginning of the sample period because the sample size increases with time. The negative 
correlation between the number of exposures and the unexpected loss difference between 
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UL difference No of exposures
 
Note: The UL difference is the difference between the benchmark and the ASRF ULs. ULs are expressed 
as percentages of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. The benchmark model is implemented with no 
downgrade risk and a single factor. Time refers to the date at the VaR horizon, i.e. current time plus 1 year. 
 
We shall now present a temporal breakdown of the impact on the unexpected loss of 
those assumptions of the IRBA and the benchmark that differentiate these models from 
the ASRF and whose average effect was reported in Table 3. Figure 4 shows how the 
IRBA unexpected loss increases when the maturity adjustment, the PD lower bound and 
the calibration factor are introduced. The noticeable fall in the capital requirement of the 
full IRBA is mainly due to a declining average effective maturity of the portfolio which 
goes from 4.6 years at the beginning of the sample period to 3.2 years at the end of the 
period. Lower effective maturity directly reduces the maturity adjustment in (3) and (4) 
thus generating the pattern we observe. Figure 5 illustrates how the benchmark reacts to 
the introduction of downgrade risk and multiple systematic risk factors. The figure 
reveals that downgrade risk falls markedly between January 1991 and April 1993 causing 
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Note: In the picture we report the unexpected loss of the IRBA under three scenarios: 
IRBA(MA,PDlim,CF) which includes maturity adjustment, default probability floor and calibration factor; 
IRBA(MA) with only the maturity adjustments and IRBA() with none of the above which is the same as 
the ASRF model. ULs are expressed as percentages of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. Time 
refers to the date at the VaR horizon, i.e. current time plus 1 year. 
 







































































Note: In the picture we report the unexpected loss of the benchmark model under three scenarios: 
Benchmark(DR) with downgrade risk and one systematic factor, Benchmark(MF) with multiple factors and 
no downgrade risk and Benchmark() with no downgrade risk and one systematic factor. ULs are expressed 
as percentages of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. Time refers to the date at the VaR horizon, i.e. 
current time plus 1 year. 
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Finally, we investigate the core question of this study which pertains to the difference in 
capital charges produced by the full implementation of both models as well as the SA. 
Figure 6 shows that both Basel II approaches yield higher capital requirements than the 
benchmark and increasingly so as time goes by. The divergence is particularly striking 
from 1993 onward and peaks in April 1997 when IRBA and SA are about 196% and 
322% higher than the benchmark respectively. 
 









































































Note. In the Figure the benchmark is implemented with downgrade risk and multiple factors while the 
IRBA includes the maturity adjustment, the default probability floor and the calibration factor. The UL is 
expressed as a percentage of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. Time refers to the date at the VaR 
horizon, i.e. current time plus 1 year. 
 
The Figure also indicates that SA and IRBA start to diverge from the beginning of 1993. 
The SA may only produce higher capital charges when the average rating of the assets in 
the portfolio declines. From the above one may infer that the SA may become 
substantially more conservative than the IRBA as credit quality deteriorates. This point is 
summarised in Figure 7, which shows how the difference between IRBA and SA appears 
to be tightly related to the average rating in the portfolio. It should be stressed however, 
that our sample does not cover the whole rating scale and hence our conclusions may not 
apply to portfolios that have a very low credit quality. Indeed, Sironi and Resti (2007b)
20 
                                                 
20 See Figure 20.4, page 617. 
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show that for a given maturity (2.5 years) and recovery rate (45%) and given default rates 
associated with each rating category, the difference between the SA and the (foundation) 
IRBA may go up or down.  In their example, the SA produces increasingly higher capital 
requirements than the IRBA as the average quality of the portfolio declines from AA to A 
and from A to BBB, while the distance between SA and IRBA falls as one moves further 
down the rating scale. Eventually, the IRBA overtakes the SA in portfolios with B and 
CCC average rating.  
 






























































































Average Rating SA - IRBA(MA,Pdlim,CF)
 
Note. In the Figure the line with squares is the difference in capital charge between SA and the IRBA 
implemented with all adjustments. The thin line is the average rating in the portfolio. To compute the 
average rating, numerical values have been assigned to individual rating categories as follows: AAA=27, 
AA+=25, AA=24, AA-=23, A+=22, A=21 … where each further notch down causes the numerical value to 
decrease by 1.  
 
Next, we test the performance of the three models in portfolios with different risk profile. 
We construct a high risk and a low risk portfolio with 40 exposures each,  the ones with 
the lowest and highest ratings respectively among those available in our sample at each 
point in time. The results are reported in Figures 8 and 9. Although, judging from Figure 
1, the effect of portfolio concentration on these small size portfolios should produce a 
noticeable increase of the benchmark UL relative to the IRBA UL, it turns out that, as 
before, the IRBA yields, in most cases, capital charges that are higher (and often much 
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higher) than the benchmark. So, the maturity adjustment, PD floor and calibration factor 
in the IRBA more than compensate for the granularity effect in the benchmark. Also, 
since the number of assets in the portfolio remains constant over time, it follows that the 
increasing discrepancy between the regulatory models and the benchmark can not be the 
result of changes in granularity. We will explore the causes of such differences with 
regression analysis in the next section. 
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Note. In the Figures the benchmark is implemented with downgrade risk and multiple factors while the 
IRBA includes the maturity adjustment, the default probability floor and the calibration factor. The high 
(low) risk portfolio includes, at each point in time, the 40 bonds with the lowest (highest) rating in the 
sample. The UL is expressed as a percentage of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. Time refers to 
the date at the VaR horizon, i.e. current time plus 1 year. 
 
In the low risk portfolio the IRBA systematically overshoots the benchmark. The SA also 
produces higher capital charges except for the first few months in 1989 when it falls 
below the benchmark. Also, as the credit quality of the portfolio does not fluctuate much 
and it always lies in the first rating bucket, the SA capital charge is flat at 1.6%, given by 
the product of the top rating bucket risk weight (20%) and the 8% Cooke ratio. 
 
Figure 6, 8 and 9 show that none of the Basel II models consistently yields a higher 
capital charge. However, according to the last quantitative impact study run by the Basel 
Committee before the final approval of the Basel II framework in 2006 (see BCBS 
2006b) the SA yielded on average, across all the 382 banks in the 32 countries that 
participated in the exercise, a higher capital requirement than either implementation of 
the IRBA (foundation or advanced)
21. But, it should be noted that the impact study was 
done at a particular point in time and hence its result need not apply in general. The SA 
                                                 
21 See Table 1 page 2 of BCBS (2006b). 
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will produce higher regulatory capital than the IRBA when economic conditions are 
particularly benign, as was the case during the last impact study. This is because 
internally derived default probabilities within each rating category will fall and thus will 
compress the unexpected loss of the IRBA. On the contrary, the SA capital charges can 
not reflect such change in PD as they are fixed for each rating category.  
 




















































































Whole Sample High Risk Portfolio Low Risk Portfolio
 
Note: In the Figure we report the difference between the unexpected loss derived with the IRBA with all 
the adjustments and the benchmark implemented with downgrade risk and multiple factors. The UL 
difference is expressed as a percentage of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. Time refers to the date 
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Whole Sample High Risk Portfolio Low Risk Portfolio
 
Note: In the Figure we report the difference between the unexpected loss derived with the SA and the 
benchmark implemented with downgrade risk and multiple factors. The capital charge difference is 
expressed as a percentage of expected portfolio value at time t + 1 year. Time refers to the date at the VaR 




Figures 10 and 11 report the difference between the two Basel models and the benchmark 
and are derived directly from Figures 6,8 and 9. Under the IRBA, the overestimation bias 
is always positive for the whole portfolio and the low risk sub-portfolio and its average 
over the sample period is 95% and 82% above the benchmark respectively. In the high 
risk sub-portfolio the bias is much more volatile and, surprisingly, becomes considerably 
negative in 1991. The lowest IRBA bias is –0.84% of (expected) portfolio value and 
occurs in November 1991. This is 37% lower than the benchmark UL. On the other hand, 
the maximum over-estimation occurs in November 1995 with a whopping 375% increase 
on the benchmark level.  
 
In the SA the bias exhibits a wider variation than the IRBA bias when we look at the 
whole portfolio and the low risk sub-portfolio. This is no doubt the result of the lower 
risk sensitivity of the SA. Indeed the fixed risk weights of the SA do not change when the 
default probability, asset correlation or downgrade risk vary. So, the SA bias fully reflects 
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the changes in the benchmark due to fluctuations in these factors. On the other hand, the 
range of variation of the SA bias for the high risk portfolio is comparable to that of the 
IRBA and is in fact, slightly lower. This indicates that both regulatory models share 
comparable (and substantial) inaccuracy when measuring the risk in low quality 
portfolios. Similarly to the IRBA, the lowest and highest SA biases occur in the high risk 
portfolio. The lowest bias comes about in February 1991 and equals –0.65% of the 
expected portfolio value, 25% below the benchmark. The highest bias happens in 
December 1995 and is equal to 3.01%, which is 335% above the benchmark.  
 
In conclusion, Figure 6, 8 and 9 reveal that the regulatory models are closer to each other 
than to the benchmark. Then, it appears that although the IRBA is a step in the right 
direction from a fixed risk weight approach such as Basel I and the SA in Basel II, still it 
has not yet gone half the way towards a full portfolio model. It is also clear that the 
difference between the two Basel models and the benchmark (Figure 10 and 11) may 
vary substantially over time, an indication that they exhibit difference sensitivity to 
mutating economic conditions. This suggests that the extent of the overestimation (and 
occasional underestimation) can not be simply fixed by a scaling factor. Moreover, the 
alternating sign of the bias shows that the regulatory models may lead to capital 
requirements that are not necessarily conservative, as often believed, but could in fact be 
too low at times. 
 
 
5.1 Regression Analysis 
 
In this section we explore the causes behind the time variation in the overestimation bias 
of the Basel II models discussed in the previous section. This will help us to identify the 
factors that may cause the regulatory models to misrepresent portfolio credit risk. We 
carry out this analysis by regressing changes in the IRBA and SA biases on changes in 
the characteristics of the portfolios. These include, (1) average effective maturity, (2) 
average rating, which denotes both the internal rating for the IRBA and the external 
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rating for the SA,
22 (3) average default probability, (4) portfolio concentration as 
measured by the Herfindahl index, (5) systematic factor correlation, and (6) the level of 
downgrade risk. The rating variable has been constructed by assigning a numerical value 
to each rating as follows, AAA=27, AA+=25, AA=24, AA-=23 and so on. The wider gap 
between AAA and AA+ was present in conversion tables supplied by Reuters and 
denotes the absence of the AAA- rating and probably the greater difference in terms of 
financial strength between AAA and AA+ than between any other pair of adjacent 
ratings. Variable (5) is measured indirectly as the impact of changes in factor correlation 
on the benchmark UL. Downgrade risk is estimated as the difference in the unexpected 
loss of the benchmark when diagonal rating transition matrices (i.e. without downgrade 
risk) are replaced with full transition matrices. Regression results are reported in Table 4.  
 
The results indicate that the regulatory models do not share the same sensitivity to all 
explanatory variables. If the bias of different regulatory models is pushed in different 
directions by the same variable then banks using different models may be induced, as a 
result of regulation, to adopt different portfolio allocation and/or lending policies. For 
instance, the coefficient of effective maturity has a positive sign and is highly significant 
for the IRBA in the whole portfolio as well as the high and low risk ones. So, banks can 
decrease the IRBA overestimation bias and hence their capital requirement by decreasing 
the duration of the assets in their portfolios. This may be achieved for example with 
policies that favour short term lending or quick amortization of long term loans. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of effective maturity is either not significant (whole portfolio 
and high risk sub-portfolio) or negative and highly significant (low risk sub-portfolio) in 
the SA. This implies that a bank that adopts the SA and has a high quality portfolio can 
reduce overestimation bias and its capital charge through long term lending, which is 
exactly the opposite outcome to that obtained with the IRBA.  
 
                                                 
22 An interesting area of investigation , which is beyond the purpose of this paper, would be to explore if 
there are any systematic differences between agency ratings and banks’ own ratings and how they impact 
on SA and IRBA regulatory capital. Differences may occur, for example, because of different emphasis on 
the rating time horizon (point-in-time or through-the-cycle) and differences in the definition of default.  
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Higher effective maturity makes the maturity adjustment defined in (4) to go up which 
ultimately produces higher capital requirements. Given the positive sign of effective 
maturity in the IRBA regression, higher effective maturity also causes the IRBA 
estimation bias to increase, an indication that the influence of maturity on portfolio credit 
risk appears to be over-estimated within the IRBA. This observation is consistent with 
Kalkbrener and Overbeck (2003) who reached a similar conclusion when investigating 
the maturity effect in the 2001 version of the New Accord. On the other hand, the 
negative and highly significant coefficient of effective maturity under the SA in the low 
risk portfolio results from the influence of maturity on the benchmark model. Longer 
maturity produces higher volatility of forward bond values and hence higher unexpected 
loss from  the benchmark. Since the SA is not affected by maturity, then when maturity 
goes up the gap between the SA and the benchmark will shrink which is the effect 
captured by the regression coefficient. However, such effect does not seem to be so 
prominent in the whole sample and in the high risk portfolio. 
 
Downgrade risk has a negative and always significant sign in both the IRBA and SA 
regression. In other words, when downgrade risk goes up, the benchmark model will 
reflect the change with higher unexpected losses and the IRBA and SA overestimation 
bias will fall. It is interesting to note that the maturity adjustment was introduced in the 
IRBA to account for downgrade risk.
23 But, the fact that the two variables are lowly 
correlated (0.28 correlation in first differences in the whole sample) and that each can 
only explain a fraction of the volatility of the other
24 suggest that the maturity adjustment 
does not accurately capture downgrade risk. 
 
Although the level of granularity is important in explaining the difference between IRBA 
and benchmark (see Figure 2), regression results show that changes in granularity are not 
significant in explaining changes in such difference, probably because they have been 
gradual over time and hence overshadowed by the effect of other variables. Even though 
the sign of the concentration variable, which is a measure of granularity, is not 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Resti and Sironi (2007b), p. 611. 
24 When we regress one variable on the other, plus a constant, for the whole sample we find the adjusted R-
squared to be 7.2%. 
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significant, still, as one might expect, it is negative. This means that higher concentration 
pushes the UL of the benchmark higher and closer to the regulatory models’ ULs (as the 
latter remain unaffected by concentration). 
 
The correlation between the external rating and default probability variables is negative, 
as expected.
25 However, the level of correlation is not as high as to cause concern for 
multicollinearity (-41% in the whole portfolio, -79% in the high risk portfolio and –61% 
in the low risk portfolio). The reason for including both variables in the regression is that 
default probability may change within the same rating category over time. So default 
probability and rating need not move in unison. Also, changes in the external rating 
produce an impact on SA while changes in default probability do not.  
 
The rating variable influences both the IRBA and the benchmark in a similar way since a 
change in rating brings about a change in the rating’s associated default probability. 
However, the negative sign of the variable’s coefficient suggests that the distance 
between the IRBA and the benchmark increases as the rating deteriorates. This may 
follow because of the parameterisation of the IRBA which appears to become more and 
more conservative as credit quality goes down.  
 
Similarly, higher values of the default probability variable bring about higher IRBA 
overestimation bias in the whole (average quality) portfolio. The direction of the 
relationship is the same as in the high risk portfolio but the default  probability coefficient 
in that instance is not significant. The result in the low risk portfolio is more curious as 
the default probability coefficient is negative and highly significant. This implies that 
higher credit quality (i.e. lower PD) causes the gap between IRBA and benchmark to 
grow, which appears to contradict our previous conclusions. In fact, the finding seems to 
be the result of the PD floor of 0.03% in the IRBA. As the credit quality improves and the 
probability of default keeps falling below the 0.03% limit, the benchmark UL will fall 
while the IRBA UL will not be affected. Hence, the gap between the two opens up. 
According to this line of reasoning, however, the rating’s coefficient in the low risk 
                                                 
25 The correlation was estimated on the first difference of the variables. 
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portfolio should be positive, while it is negative and highly significant. The reason for it, 
is that the rating variable for the low risk portfolio only changes in the first two years of 
the sample period, when the usual negative relationship between credit quality and 
overestimation bias still applies. After that, the average rating of the portfolio is flat at the 
AAA level (as all assets in the high risk portfolio are AAA rated from January 1991). 
Therefore, the negative relationship between credit quality and overestimation bias does 
not carry into the remaining years (i.e. most of the sample period) when the PD limit 
effect kicks in. 
 
Unlike in the IRBA, in the SA both the rating and default probability coefficients are 
always negative. The two variables have the same sign because the SA is only affected by 
ratings and not by default probability. The negative sign of the rating variable means that, 
similarly to the IRBA, the SA appears to become more conservative than the benchmark 
as the credit rating deteriorates. On the other hand, a higher value of the default 
probability variable causes the benchmark unexpected loss to increase while leaving the 
SA unexpected loss unaffected, which results in a lower SA overestimation bias. 
 
The factor correlation variable is significant only in the high risk portfolio under both 
regulatory models. Its sign is negative in the high risk portfolio because if factor 
correlation goes up (down) the benchmark UL will go up and the overestimation bias will 
have to fall (increase) as the variable does not have any bearing on the regulatory models.  
 
It should be noted that the low risk portfolio under both IRBA and SA produces 
coefficients for all the explanatory variables, with the exception of effective maturity, that 
have very similar values (often identical up to three digits). This is because the IRBA and 
SA overestimation biases in the low risk portfolio are highly correlated (65% on first 
differences) as they are overwhelmingly influenced by the behaviour of the benchmark 
model (see Figure 9).
26  
 
                                                 
26 The SA unexpected loss is constant over the sample period so the SA bias is entirely driven by the 
benchmark loss. In the case of the IRBA, although its unexpected loss changes, it does so with little 
volatility, so again the IRBA bias is dominated by the benchmark loss. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we test the accuracy of the new credit risk measurement techniques 
introduced with Basel II. We do so by comparing the credit risk measures produced by 
the new regulatory framework with those obtained with a benchmark model that removes 
several of the restrictive assumptions of the former. We find that the discrepancies 
between regulatory models and the benchmark may be large. Our results may be 
summarised as follows: (1) The regulatory models are typically more conservative than 
the benchmark and may occasionally produce risk estimates that are more than three 
times higher than the benchmark level. This should raise some concern as the finding 
combined with the higher risk sensitivity of the new regulation may well exacerbate 
credit rationing in periods of economic recession. (2) Credit risk underestimation is also 
possible although its magnitude during our observation period is small compared to the 
overestimation bias (37% and 25% below the benchmark under the IRBA and the SA 
respectively). The implication is that banks may at times be over-exposed to credit risk, 
despite the conservative approach taken in devising the new rules. (3) Contrary to the 
evidence presented in the last quantitative impact study undertaken by the Basel 
Committee (see BCBS 2006) we find that the standardised approach may yield lower 
capital requirements than the internal rating based approach, when default rates are high 
and the portfolio has long duration. (4) The difference between the regulatory models and 
the benchmark depends on the combined effect of several variables. As a result, the 
discrepancy could not be corrected easily, for example with the use of a constant scaling 
factor. (5) We find the more advanced internal rating based model (IRBA) to yield risk 
measures that are on average closer to the standardised approach than to the benchmark 
model. This suggests that although the IRBA and the benchmark are both portfolio 
models, the simplifying assumptions in the IRBA offset a large proportion of the benefits 
of a  portfolio approach to credit risk modelling. (6) Different regulatory models can 
produce different incentives and, as a consequence, different portfolio allocation 
distortions in banks. For instance, the adoption of the IRBA may induce banks to shorten 
the duration of their assets to attract lower capital requirements and align regulatory 
capital with economic capital. On the other hand, the SA has little sensitivity to asset 
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duration. So, banks could successfully engage in regulatory capital arbitrage by investing 
in assets with longer duration. (7) Finally, we find that the maturity adjustment appears to 
be a poor proxy for downgrade risk. 
 
We should emphasise that our conclusions are based on the benchmark we employ in this 
study. Although the chosen benchmark provides a natural way to relax the assumptions in 
Basel II and is a widely popular model, its predictive ability has not been thoroughly 
investigated yet, partly due to data availability issues which make backtesting 
problematic.
27 Furthermore, in this work we do not consider possible generalisations of 
the benchmark in which recovery risk and credit spread risk are accounted for as 
suggested by Kiesel et al (2001). These generalisations are likely to increase the capital 
requirements implied by the benchmark. However, this will not necessarily result in a 
greater consistency between the regulatory models and the benchmark as the additional 
risks, which are not captured by the regulatory models, will create further points of 
departure between the two. Moreover, the introduction of these risks leaves open the 
question of how to model the dependence between credit spreads, recovery rates and 














                                                 
27 For a first analysis of the out-of-sample performance of such benchmark see Nickell et al (2007). 
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Appendix. Derivation of downturn probability of default in the internal rating 
based approach 
 
Following Vasicek (2002), let us assume that the asset return   of any borrower s in a 
loan portfolio depends on one systematic risk factor only, X, and that the asset correlation 
between any two borrowers is constant and equal to R. Also, assume that the variables 
 for s=1,2,… are jointly standard normal. Then,   will be 
s Q
s Q s Q
 
R Z R X Q s s − + = 1  
 
where X and Z1, Z2, … are mutually independent standard normals. The unconditional 
probability of default for borrower s is simply, 
 
( ) ( ) d , s d , s s s Q Q Q P PD Φ = < =  
 
where Q  is the default threshold for borrower s. On the other hand, the conditional 
probability of default depends on the value taken by the systematic factor X. Let us 
denote such value as x. Then, the conditional probability can be written as, 
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In a downturn X will be very low (that is very negative). Let us call the value of X in a 
downturn,  . Basel II assumes a downturn scenario that occurs once every 1000 
years. Then,   in Basel II will be, 
down x
down x
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So, the probability of default of borrower s conditional on a downturn that occurs with 
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Country  No. of firms  % 
    
United States  233  46.4 
Japan 42  8.4 
Netherlands 36  7.2 
United Kingdom  27  5.4 
Germany 17  3.4 
France 16  3.2 
Other 131  26.1 
    
Industry 
 




Financial Services  160  31.9 
Banking 111  22.1 
Utilities 27  5.4 
Energy 20  4.0 
Merchandising 15  3.0 
Telecoms 15  3.0 
Other 154  30.7 
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Table 2 
Risk Weights under the Standardised Approach in Basel II 
 
Rating Sovereign  Banks  Banks  Corporates 
      (Option 1)  (Option 2)    
AAA 0  0.2  0.2  0.2 
AA+ 0  0.2  0.2  0.2 
AA 0  0.2 0.2  0.2 
AA- 0  0.2  0.2  0.2 
A+  0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 
A  0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 
A-  0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 
BBB+  0.5 1 0.5 1 
BBB  0.5 1 0.5 1 
BBB-  0.5 1 0.5 1 
BB+  1 1 1 1 
BB  1 1 1 1 
BB-  1 1 1 1 
B+ 1  1  1  1.5 
B 1  1  1  1.5 
B- 1  1  1  1.5 
<B-  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
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Table 3 
Impact of IRBA and the Benchmark 
models' assumptions on Capital Charge 
 
This table reports the marginal capital charges produced by the various assumptions underlying 
the IRBA model in Basel II and the benchmark model. Estimates are averages over the sample 
period based on the implementation of the models on our bond data. Marginal effects are 
percentages expressed in terms of the capital charge of the ASRF model of Gordy (2003). 
 
 
  Marginal Capital Charges, 
Assumptions  % of ASRF 
  
 IRBA 
Maturity Adjustment  82.4 
PD floor  50.4 
Calibration factor  14.0 
IRBA Total  146.8 
 Benchmark 
Granularity 36.9 
Multiple Factors  -41.5 
Downgrade Risk  108.6 
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Table 4 
Regression of changes in Basel II overestimation  
biases on changes of portfolio characteristics 
The table reports the estimation results of regressions that aim to explain changes in the 
overestimation bias in Basel II’s internal rating based approach (IRBA) and standardised 
approach (SA) relative to the benchmark model. The estimation bias is measured as the 
difference between the unexpected loss obtained from one of the Basel II approaches and that of 
the benchmark model. The benchmark model is CreditMetrics implemented with the inclusion of 
downgrade risk and multiple systematic factors. The sample includes monthly observations over 
the period from January 1989 to February 1998. Explanatory variables are in first differences and 
include: portfolio “Concentration” as measured by the Herfindahl index; average “rating”; average 
“default probability”; average “effective maturity”; “downgrade risk” which is estimated as the 
difference in unexpected loss of the benchmark model when diagonal rating transition matrices 
(i.e. without downgrade risk) are replaced with full transition matrices; and the variable that 
measures systematic “factor correlation”. The “high risk portfolio” (“low risk portfolio”) columns 
denote a portion of the sample including, at each point in time, the 40 firms with the lowest 
(highest) rating. Parameters are estimated with ordinary least squares. ***,**,* indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. Confidence intervals are 
estimated with standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
  IRBA overestimation bias  SA overestimation bias 
   High  Low      High  Low 
  Whole Risk  Risk Whole  Risk Risk 
   Portfolio  Portfolio  Portfolio Portfolio  Portfolio  Portfolio 
              
Constant 0.006  -0.007 0.002 0.001  0.017  0.002 
              
Concentration -10.32  -  -  -80.77  -  - 
              
Rating -0.162  -0.541***  -1.111***  -0.357***  -0.154  -1.111*** 
              
Default Prob.  21.74***  0.147  -23680.2*** -52.14***  -40.69*** -23685.6***
              
Effective Maturity  0.482***  0.411** 0.319***  0.010  -0.093  -0.112*** 
              
Downgrade Risk  -0.565***  -0.233*  -0.331***  -0.649***  -0.332***  -0.331*** 
              
Factor Correlation  0.016  -0.287*** -0.226  0.055  -0.195***  -0.226 
              
              
Adj. R-squared  0.452  0.609 0.644 0.481  0.387  0.531 
 
 